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NOTE AND COMMENT

DISBARMENT OR SuSPENsIoN or AfroaNxY.-The decision of the Supreme
Court of Oregon in the case of State ex rel Grievance Committee of State
Bar Association v. Tanner, rendered Jan. 12, I9O7, 88 Pac. Rep. 301, is of
sufficient importance to merit brief notice. The proceeding was instituted by
the grievance committee of the State Bar Association for the removal from
practice of the, defendant, an attorney at law, under a statute of the State
that provides for the removal or suspension of an attorney from practice by
the Supreme Court "upon his being convicted of a felony or of a misde-
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meanor involving moral turpitude." The information alleged that, on a date
named, a United States grand jury returned an indictment against defendant,
charging him with the crime of perjury; that to this indictment he entered a
plea of guilty, but that subsequently, and before further steps had been taken,
the indictment, on motion of the government, was dismissed, for the reason
that the defendant had been pardoned by the President of the United States.
It was insisted in the information that the plea of guilty amounted to a conviction of a felony, from the consequences of which the defendant was not
absolved by the subsequent pardon. The defendant answered the information admitting the facts but contesting the claim that the plea of guilty, under
the circumstances, amounted to a conviction of a felony. By way of further
and separate answer, the defendant alleged that the perjury with which he
was charged, was not committed in the actual trial of any cause and that it
did not occur in connection with any professional matter or with the discharge of any professional duty to any court or client, but during a hearing
before a United States grand jury, sitting to investigate certain alleged criminal acts of John H. Mitchell, Senator of the United States, before which
defendant had been called as a witness. He admitted that in testifying before
said grand jury to facts other than those which were the strict and absolute
truth, he made a great mistake and was guilty of a great wrong, but by way
of extenuation of the offense he submitted the following: That he had for
years been a close and intimate friend of Senator Mitchell and his law partner
since iSo; that the senator assured him that the charges were the result of
political intrigue and the persecution of his enemies in the political faction
opposed to him; that he represented to the defendaht that, "the practice of
taking money for appearances before the department had at one time been
customary and proper, and that the charges themselves were simply an accusation of a breach of the written law, and not a breach of any inherent morality," and that he implored him "in a most pathetic manner to stand between
him and disgrace and ruin in his old age, after a lifetime of public service,"
representing that his fate was in the hands of defendant. And the defendant
further stated by way of answer and extenuation, that though he protested
until the last against what he was asked to do, he "did not have the strength
to resist the most heartrending pleadings of a man like Senator Mitchell to
whom" he "was tied by bonds of long association, obligation, and most kindly
feeling," and that it was under such circumstances that, as a citizen, he
appeared before the said grand jury, and, rather than seem a traitor to Senator Mitchell, testified that the partnership agreement between himself and
Senator Mitchell was to the effect that all moneys paid for services in the
land department belonged to defendant individually, whereas, in fact, they
belonged to both jointly. He disclaimed having anything to gain by his false
testimony, and insisted "that his conduct was influenced wholly and entirely
by a feeling of loyalty toward Senator Mitchell and a great pity for his distress." The defendant showed further "that afterwards he appeared in open
court, the said grand jury being present, and told the whole truth, exactly as
the facts warranted, and that he so testified when sworn as a witness, during
the course of the trial."
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It appeared that defendant had practiced law in the city of 'Portland for
more than twenty-five years and that never before had his standing as a man
or as a lawyer been the subject of criticism. It was stipulated that the answer
of defendant should be treated as evidence, and the case was submitted upon
the information, the answer, and a copy of the testimony of defendant as
given on the trial of United States v. Mitchell in the federal court.
After suggesting that it was doubtful if a mere plea or verdict of guilty
could be regarded as a conviction within the meaning of the statute under
which the proceeding was brought and citing authorities in support, but
without deciding the question, as the attitude of the defendant in waiving
technical defenses and freely admitting his guilt, made a decision unnecessary, the court said by way of conclusion and judgment: "There are circumstances which call for the exercise of clemency, but that does not justify the
offense. The crime with which the defendant is charged, and the commission
of which he admits, was a serious one, deliberately and intentionally committed, and the court would be unmindful of the duty it owes to itself, to the
profession and to the public, if it allowed it to go unrebuked. Proceedings
for the disbarment of an attorney, however, are not for the purpose of punishing him for the commission of a crime. That matter is left to the criminal
courts. The objects of the proceedings here are to uphold the dignity and
purity of the profession, protect the courts, preserve the administration of
justice, and protect clients, and it is believed that it is not necessary, in order
to accomplish this purpose, that the defendant should be permanently disbarred, but he will be suspended for a period of ninety days."
The court was certainly lenient with the defendant. There were, to be
sure, extenuating circumstances, yet the offense was a grave one, particularly
in 'view of the fact that it was committed by a lawyer, who above all men
should realize, and by his example nd teaching enforce; the fact that the
integrity of our judicial system depends to a very large extent upon a general
recognition of, and respect for, the sanctity of an oath. While it is undoubtedly true that proceedings for disbarment are not taken primarily for the
punishment of the attorney, but rather for the purpose of sustaining the profession in its dignity and purity, yet the notion that they are not taken for
punishment ought never to become so prominent in the mind of the court as
practically to defeat the real object of the proceedings. It may, perhaps, be
doubted if the order in this case will serve in any considerable degree "to
uphold the dignity and purity of the profession, protect the courts, preserve
the administration of justice, and protect clients," when it is seen that it was
made in the case of an attorney who had been guilty of the crime of perjury.
It may be of interest to call attention to other cases in which mitigating
circumstances have been considered by the courts in connection with proceedings for disbarment. In re Stephens, 84 Cal. 77, 24 Pac. Rep. 46, was a proceeding in the Supreme Court of the State for the disbarment of respondent
for unprofessional conduct in encouraging the prosecution of an action and
then, without any change of mind as to the guilt or innocence of the accused,
assuming his defense. It was urged in mitigation that the evidence as to
the graver features of the charge was conflicting and that the respondent was
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led to take the course that he did through concern felt for a brother who was
accused of a crime and whose case would be affected by respondent's attitude. The court held that, while the respondent had been clearly guilty of
unprofessional conduct, the offense, under the circumstances of the case,
should not be regarded as of a sufficiently grave nature to call for total disbarment, but that respondent should be suspended from practice for a
period of six months, an order that was subsequently modified somewhat in
respondent's favor on account of a petition from the bar of the county in
which he had practiced. In People v. McCabe, i Col. 186, 32 Pac. Rep.
280, 36 Am. St. Rep. 270, 19 L. R. A. 231, proceedings for disbarment were
taken against defendant for advertising for divorce business. It was shown
in mitigation that defendant advertised in entire ignorance that it was
wrong; that he ceased so to do in deference to the court upon the commencement of the proceedings, and that if the court should adjudge such
advertising to be wrong or to be malconduct in office as an attorney, within
the meaning of the statute, he would cheerfully abide by and obey the directions of the court. In view of the showing, the court concluded that defendant should be suspended from practice for the period of six months and until
all costs of the proceedings should be paid by him. See, also, People v.
Taylor, 32 Col. 250, 75 Pac. Rep. 914. Where an attorney altered an undertaking, and without procuring its re-execution or re-acknowledgment, used
it upon an application for an attachnrent, he was held guilty of professional
misconduct, but in view of his youth and inexperience (he had been admitted
to the bar less than a year), the court concluded that "he would be sufficiently
punished and the honor of the profession vindicated" by a judgment of suspension from practice for two years. In re Goldberg, 79 Hun, 616, 29 N. Y.
Supp. 972. In People v. George, 186 Ill. 122, it was held that an attorney
who had been convicted of a felony should be disbarred, although pardoned
by the Governor of the State, the reason being that the pardon does not
restore the "good moral character" required by the statute of members of
the bar. See, also, People v. Gilmore, 214 Ill. 569.
As compared with the orders in the foregoing cases, the order in the case
under review was lenient in the extreme, and it will doubtless be regarded
H. B. H.
by many as altogether too lenient.
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